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ABSTRACT 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision to gut the Coverage Formula of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in Shelby 
County v. Holder, election lawyers and academics have searched for a different way to protect minority voters.  
Many have turned to Section 2 of the VRA which prohibits intentional and effectual minority vote dilution.  But 
a small contingency at the Supreme Court has long argued—beginning with Justice Clarence Thomas’s 
concurrence in Holder v. Hall—that Section 2 cannot be used to challenge the redistricting process.  Although 
Section 2 has withstood this opposition, there is a renewed concern that recent changes in the Supreme Court’s 
composition is breathing new life into this debate and foreshadowing Section 2’s demise. 
This Article explores that concern, and considers whether states are presently prepared to protect minority voting 
rights without Section 2.  First, it explains Section 2’s purpose and examines the merit of public concern regarding 
Section 2.  Next, this Article supposes—to borrow from baseball vernacular—that Section 2 is “going, gutted, 
gone,” and thus creates four categories to represent how states presently protect minority voters.  Then it considers 
how the Court might do away with Section 2, and concludes that states are largely unprepared to be without 
Section 2’s minority voter protection in the legislative redistricting context.  Finally, this Article surveys the methods 
used in states that have minority voter protections beyond what appear in Section 2 to offer as possible solutions 
in jurisdictions that need additional minority voter protections.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Not so long ago, the United States government required certain states 
and local jurisdictions to preclear any changes to election standards, 
practices, and procedures.1  The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”)2 
granted the federal government this authority to address the country’s history 
of minority voter discrimination.3  Section 5 of the VRA assigned the federal 
government its preclearance authority,4 but this oversight was fueled by 
Section 4(b)5 (the “Coverage Formula”) which designated the jurisdictions 
subject to preclearance.6  
The Coverage Formula was crucial to the federal government’s ability to 
protect minority voters because it served as the instrument to bring each 
jurisdiction under Section 5.  Once subject to preclearance, the federal 
government could ensure that no new election standards, practices, and 
procedures had a retrogressive effect on minority voters’ ability to participate 
in elections, and that no laws written with a discriminatory purpose could be 
enacted.7  This system worked—the VRA was reauthorized various times 
over the next forty years8 as the federal government processed thousands of 
preclearance requests.9   
But in 2009, the Supreme Court telegraphed the Coverage Formula’s 
demise.  In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One vs. Holder, the 
majority upheld Section 5 of the VRA but noted that it “impose[d] 
substantial federalism costs” and “differentiate[d] between the States, despite 
[the United States’] historic tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal 
sovereignty.’”10  The Court noted that blatantly discriminatory election 
administration practices were a rarity compared to when the VRA was 
 
 1 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4–5, 79 Stat. 437, 438–39 (codified as amended 
at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303–10304 (2012)). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Eric S. Lynch, Note, Trusting the Federalism Process Under Unique Circumstances: United States Election 
Administration and Cybersecurity, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1979, 1992–93 (2019) (outlining the 
mechanics of VRA enforcement).  
 4 52 U.S.C. § 10304. 
 5 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b). 
 6 Id. 
 7 DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 104–08 (2d ed. 2017). 
 8 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as 
42 U.S.C. 1973b (2012)); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Amendments, Pub. L. 94-73, § 206, 89 Stat. 
400, 402 (1975) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973d, 1973k (2012)); Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, § 2, 84 Stat. 314, 314–15. 
 9 See TOKAJI, supra note 7, at 28, 103. 
 10 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202–03 (2009) (quoting United 
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960)).  
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enacted, and thus questioned whether covered jurisdictions still required 
federal oversight.11  
Four years later, the Supreme Court finally gutted Section 5 in Shelby 
County v. Holder.12  The Court found that the Coverage Formula was based 
on “decades-old data and eradicated practices”—like the use of literacy tests 
and poll taxes to discriminate against racial minority voters, and voter 
registration and turnout data from the 1960s to the early 1970s—even 
though circumstances had significantly improved.13  Since the “[Coverage 
Formula]’s ‘current burdens’ [were not] justified by ‘current needs,’ and any 
‘disparate geographic coverage’ [had to] be ‘sufficiently related to the 
problem that it target[ed],’” the Court held that the Coverage Formula was 
unconstitutional.14  
Since Shelby County, election lawyers have debated how the VRA might 
be redirected to continue serving as a robust protector of minority voters in 
the democratic process, with an emphasis on Section 2 of the VRA.15  Section 
2 prohibits intentional and effectual minority vote dilution.16  But a small 
contingency within the Supreme Court has argued that Section 2 cannot be 
 
 11 See id. at 203.  
 12 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 13 Id. at 551.  The Court recognized that “such tests [had] been banned nationwide for over 40 years.  
And voter registration and turnout numbers in the covered States [had] risen dramatically in the 
years since.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 14 Id. at 551 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).  The 
Court notably left the door open to Congress instituting an updated formula, see id. at 557, but 
Congress has yet to act on that option.  
 15 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as amended at 52 
U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)); see, e.g., Dale E. Ho, Something Old, Something New, or Something Really Old? 
Second Generation Racial Gerrymandering Litigation as Intentional Racial Discrimination Cases, 59 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1887 (2018) (arguing that Section 2 be used to bring more intent-based 
discrimination claims); Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 439 (2015) (advocating a three-part test focusing on disparate impact to challenge voting 
practices and procedures under Section 2); Jesus N. Joslin, Comment, Navigating the Post-Shelby 
Landscape: Using Universalism to Augment the Remaining Power of the Voting Rights Act, 19 SCHOLAR 217 
(2017) (advocating that states adopt practices and procedures that protect voting rights—like 
automatic voter registration, online voting, and expanding early voting—rather than rely on the 
VRA); Edward K. Olds, Note, More Than “Rarely Used”: A Post-Shelby Judicial Standard for Section 3 
Preclearance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2185 (2017) (explaining how preclearance can be reanimated 
through Section 3 of the VRA). 
 16 52 U.S.C. § 10301; see infra Part I.A (elaborating on Section 2’s scope and function).  There are two 
different kinds of claims under Section 2:  vote denial and vote dilution.  See Tokaji, supra note 15, 
at 442.  The former “concerns impediments to voting and the counting of votes,” and the latter 
“implicate[s] the value of participation [, for example] being able to register, vote, and have one’s 
vote counted.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Since this Article focuses on redistricting, the analysis 
exclusively considers Section 2 vote dilution claims. 
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used to challenge the redistricting process.17  Section 2 has withstood this 
opposition and continues to be an important tool to combat minority voter 
suppression.18  But there is a renewed concern that recent changes in the 
Supreme Court’s composition are breathing new life into this opposition and 
foreshadow Section 2’s demise similar to how Northwest Austin signaled the 
end of the Coverage Formula.19  
This Article explores that concern, and considers whether states are 
prepared to protect minority voting rights without Section 2.  First, this 
Article explains Section 2’s purpose and examines the merit of public 
concern regarding Section 2.20  Next, it supposes that—to borrow from 
baseball vernacular21—that Section 2 is “going, gutted, gone,” and thus 
creates four categories to represent how states presently protect minority 
voters.22  Then it considers how the Court might do away with Section 2, 
and concludes that states are largely unprepared to be without Section 2’s 
minority voter protection in the legislative redistricting context.23  Finally, 
this Article surveys the methods used in states that have minority voter 
 protections beyond what appear in Section 2 to offer as possible solutions 
in jurisdictions that need additional minority voter protections.24  
 
 17 See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the “size of a 
governing body” is not within the terms of the Section 2); infra notes 522–666 and accompanying 
text (considering Justice Thomas’s continuing opposition to race-conscious districting). 
 18 See, e.g., Jessica Cassella, Note, Using Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Fight Voter Suppression Tactics After 
Shelby County v. Holder Without a New Section 4(b) Formula, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161 (2014) 
(arguing that reframing Section 2 can replace a gutted Coverage Formula to challenge voter 
suppression tactics). 
 19 See infra Part I.B.  Although the circumstances are similar, the Coverage Formula and Section 2 
differ in their legal application.  Whereas the Coverage Formula’s minority voter protections only 
applied to those covered jurisdictions, see Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 
Stat. 437, 438 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012)), Section 2 protections extend 
to every “State and political subdivision,” § 10301(a).  Thus, the termination of Section 2 could 
have even more widespread implications than the Coverage Formula.  
 20 See infra Part I. 
 21 Former Cincinnati Reds broadcaster Harry Hartman famously described homeruns as “Going, 
Going, Gone!”  GREG RHODES, CINCINNATI REDS HALL OF FAME HIGHLIGHTS 106 (2011). 
 22 See infra Part II. 
 23 See infra Part III.  This Article focuses its analysis on state-legislative redistricting.  Notably, this 
means that this Article does not review or analyze any municipal, school district, county, or federal-
congressional redistricting practices. 
 24 See infra Part IV.  This Article concentrates on what states can do to further protect minority voters 
through redistricting, but it recognizes that there are other means to protect the democratic process 
besides the VRA.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 n.7 (1983) (finding that 
Ohio’s early petition filing deadline imposed on third-party candidates violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments); Ben F.C. Wallace, Note, Charting Procedural Due Process and the Fundamental 
Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 647 (2015) (examining procedural due process as a tool to protect 
voting rights). 
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I.  EXPLAINING SECTION 2 AND ITS UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
Section 2 began as an original VRA provision in 1965.25  This iteration 
only prohibited election standards, practices, and procedures that intentionally 
denied equal access to the political process.26  Although this may now seem 
like an oversight, the drafters’ focus on intentional discrimination is best 
understood by considering the rampant race-based voter intimidation that 
preceded the VRA’s passage.27 
Congress revised Section 2 several times over the years.28  The current 
version now forbids both intentional and effectual voter discrimination: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision 
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in 
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [52 USCS § 
10303(f)(2)], as provided in subsection (b). 
(b)  A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination 
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to 
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in 
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate 
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.  The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected 
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may 
be considered:  Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to 
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their 
proportion in the population.29 
In short, Section 2 “prevent[s] the inequitable dilution of minority 
communities’ voting power where alternative districts might otherwise allow 
minorities to maintain an effective opportunity to elect candidates of 
 
 25 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as amended at 52 
U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)). 
 26 See id. (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall 
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen 
of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”) (emphasis added). 
 27 See Lynch, supra note 3, at 1984–94 (providing a history of African-American disenfranchisement 
that led to the passage of the VRA). 
 28 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as 
42 U.S.C. 1973); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Amendments, Pub. L. 94-73, § 206, 89 Stat. 400, 402 
(1975) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973d, 1973k (2012)); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1970, Pub. L. 91-285, § 2, 84 Stat. 314, 314–15. 
 29 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (first emphasis added).  Subsection (a) of this statute references a different statute 
which specifically protects language minority voters.  See 52 U.S.C. § 10303(f)(2) (2012) (“No voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard practice, or procedure shall be 
imposed . . . because [the citizen] is a member of a language minority group.”) 
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choice.”30  This is a legal tool to prevent the cracking and packing 
phenomenon,31 or “vote dilution” as a catch-all term.32 
This Part both summarizes how courts analyze Section 2 claims, and why 
voting rights advocates worry that it may not be around much longer. 
A.  Legal Analysis to Section 2 Claims 
The Court explained how a plaintiff can use Section 2 to challenge a 
districting scheme in Thornberg v. Gingles.33  A successful challenge relies on 
the three Gingles conditions: compactness,34 political cohesion,35 and ability 
to elect.36  Since its initial appearance, the Court has refined the Gingles 
analysis in various cases to explain its many nuances.37  
Ultimately, even if a plaintiff survives the Gingles analysis, the challenged 
map may still comply with federal law.  Under Section 2, a vote dilution 
claim is also tested under the “totality of circumstances.”38  Gingles instructs 
that courts may use the “Senate factors”39 to conduct this examination.40  
 
 30 Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty: The New Misreading of the Voting Rights Act, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 573, 
586 (2016). 
 31 “Cracking” is when a minority voting group lives in one area but the redistricting process splits 
them into several neighboring districts so as to decrease their ability to select a candidate of choice 
in any of those districts.  Lauren Payne-Riley, A Deeper Look at Gerrymandering, POLICYMAP: 
MAPCHATS BLOG (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.policymap.com/2017/08/a-deeper-look-at-
gerrymandering/.  “Packing” is when map drawers concentrate a minority voting group into one 
district to diminish their voting power in the surrounding districts.  Id.  The best way to understand 
something is to do it.  So, any reader that would like to learn more about packing and cracking 
should visit USC ANNENBERG CTR., REDISTRICTING GAME, 
http://www.redistrictinggame.org/index.php (last visited July 25, 2020), for an excellent 
interactive educational tool. 
 32 See supra note 16 (defining “vote dilution”). 
 33 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (describing the Gingles conditions as a 
“necessary preconditions” to establish a vote dilution claim). 
 34 See id. at 50 (“First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.”). 
 35 See id. at 51 (“Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.  If the 
minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember 
electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests.”). 
 36 See id. (“Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently 
as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate 
running unopposed . . .—usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”). 
 37 See TOKAJI, supra note 7, at 128–35, for a summary of the caselaw that defined vague terms like 
“sufficiently large and geographically compact,” “politically cohesive,” and “totality of the 
circumstances.”  
 38 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012).  
 39 The name derives from a Senate report that accompanied the Voting Rights Act Amendment of 
1982.  See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205–07 
(enumerating the typical factors a plaintiff may show to establish a vote dilution violation). 
 40 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44–45. 
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The Senate factors include circumstances like the jurisdiction’s history of 
race-based voting discrimination, whether campaigns in that jurisdiction 
included overt or subtle appeals to racism, and the degree to which elected 
officials had been unresponsive to the minority group’s concerns.41     
If the Section 2 claim is successful, then the court enjoins the map and 
compels the jurisdiction to redraw the lines42—possibly transforming the 
jurisdiction into a “majority-minority district.”43  If the claim fails, then the 
district remains as-is.44 
B.  Why Section 2 May Soon Be Gone 
There are two reasons to believe that Section 2 may be on its last legs. 
First, a series of Supreme Court opinions beginning with Holder v. Hall. And 
second, recent changes in the Supreme Court's membership.  To a degree, 
these are two independent considerations, but Section 2’s longevity can be 
reasonably questioned when studying what they mean together.  
As suggested earlier, the series of Supreme Court opinions begins in 1994 
with Holder v. Hall.45  In this case, the Court considered whether Section 2 
applied to alterations in the form of government.46  A county in Georgia 
planned to replace its commissioner—who performed all legislative and 
executive functions—with a commission consisting of representatives from 
five single-member districts and one chairperson elected at-large.47  Minority 
voters contended that Section 2 required the new commission to be of a 
sufficient size so that the County’s black voters—roughly 20% of the eligible 
voting population—constituted a majority in at least one of the single-
member districts.48 
The Court reviewed Plaintiffs’ Section 2 vote dilution claim and reasoned 
that “a court must find a reasonable alternative practice as a benchmark 
 
 41 S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29. 
 42 See, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 42, 80 (affirming the district court’s injunction of a redistricting plan). 
 43 “Majority-minority districts” are districts in which “a single racial or language minority constitutes 
a majority of the population.”  The Redistricting Glossary, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/the-redistricting-lexicon-glossary.aspx (last updated 
Aug. 23, 2018). 
 44 See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313–14 (2018) (finding that all but one of the legislative 
districts reviewed were lawful). 
 45 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 876 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
 46 Id. at 876.  The appeal included Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment challenges, but the Court 
remanded the case for consideration on these constitutional claims.  Id. at 877, 885. 
 47 Id. at 876–77.  For further discussion on single member districts and at-large schemes, see infra Part 
IV.C.  
 48 Holder, 512 U.S at 876, 878. 
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against which to measure the existing voting practice.”49  Plaintiffs tried to 
establish a benchmark to compare against the County’s new municipal 
governing structure, but the Court rejected the attempt and found that no 
clear benchmark could be developed.50  Thus, the Court held that the new 
form of government “[could not] be challenged as dilutive under [Section] 
2.”51 
Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion criticized the Court’s 
Section 2 jurisprudence.52  He expressed discomfort with the Court 
positioning itself to make political judgements on reapportionment,53 
contempt for the assumption that all members of a minority group will vote 
in the same way,54 and concern that permitting race-conscious line drawing 
to create majority-minority districts would stoke racial tension.55 
In the end, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, agreed with 
the Court’s judgment but disagreed with its reasoning.56  Justice Thomas 
argued that challenging the size of a governing body is a non-starter under 
Section 2 because it is not an election “standard, practice or procedure.”57 
 
 49 Id. at 880.  The Court further reasoned that “[i]n order to decide whether an electoral system has 
made it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates they prefer, a court must have an idea in 
mind of how hard it should be for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates under an 
acceptable system.”  Id. (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 88 (1986) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in judgment)). 
 50 See id. at 881–82, 885 (rejecting Plaintiffs’ reasoning for setting the benchmark for comparison to a 
hypothetical five-member commission and finding that Plaintiffs “provide[d] no acceptable 
principles for deciding [benchmarks in] future cases”). 
 51 Id. at 881. 
 52 Id. at 891–92 (Thomas, J., concurring).  For an in-depth analysis on Justice Thomas’s concurring 
opinion in Holder, see Scott D. Gerber, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Jurisprudence of Race, 25 S.U. L. 
REV. 43, 65–72 (1997). 
 53 Holder, 512 U.S. at 893–94 (“An examination of the current state of our decisions should make 
obvious a simple fact that for far too long has gone unmentioned:  Vote dilution cases have required 
the federal courts to make decisions based on highly political judgments—judgments that courts 
are inherently ill-equipped to make.”). 
 54 Id. at 904–06.  On this point, Justice Thomas scolded the Court: “The assumptions upon which 
our vote dilution decisions have been based should be repugnant to any nation that strives for the 
ideal of a color-blind Constitution.”  Id. at 905–06. 
 55 Id. at 906–07 (“As a practical political matter, our drive to segregate political districts by race can 
only serve to deepen racial divisions by destroying any need for voters or candidates to build bridges 
between racial groups or to form voting coalitions.  ‘Black-preferred’ candidates are assured election 
in ‘safe black districts’; white-preferred candidates are assured election in ‘safe white districts.’  
Neither group needs to draw on support from the other’s constituency to win on election day.”). 
 56 Id. at 891. 
 57 See id. at 892 (“The broad reach we have given [Section 2] might suggest that the size of a governing 
body, like an election method that has the potential for diluting the vote of a minority group, should 
come within the terms of the Act.  But the gloss we have placed on the words ‘standard, practice, 
or procedure’ in cases alleging dilution is at odds with the terms of the statute and has proved utterly 
unworkable in practice.”). 
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To Justice Thomas, “an ‘effective’ vote [under the VRA] is merely one that 
has been cast and fairly counted.”58  Thus, he proposed that Section 2 be 
read only to review voting practices that affect minority citizens’ access to the 
ballot box,59 and not to judge election-related procedures, such as “the 
selection of one set of districting lines over another.”60  
Since Holder v. Hall, Justice Thomas has continued to argue this point 
during his tenure on the Court.61  He consistently opposes race-conscious 
districting—whether to crack minority voter populations through 
gerrymandering or pack minority voters into majority-minority districts—
and he opposes Section 2 being used as justification.62  
Most recently, Justice Thomas revived this opinion in Abbott v. Perez where 
the Court considered whether Texas’s state and federal districting maps 
constituted vote dilution in violation of Section 2.63  The lower court held 
that the State Legislature packed a large group of geographically compact 
Hispanic voters into a series of neighboring districts such that they were a 
minority in each instance, and thus could not elect their candidate of 
choice.64  But the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the lower court 
“disregarded the presumption of legislative good faith” and unfairly credited 
Texas’s line drawers with racial intent.65  Justice Thomas filed a concurring 
opinion reasserting his position that Section 2 should not apply to racial 
gerrymandering claims.66  
 
 58 Id. at 919. 
 59 See id. at 922 (referring to “all manner of registration requirements, the practices surrounding 
registration . . . , the locations of polling places, the times polls are open, the use of paper ballots as 
opposed to voting machines, and other similar aspects of the voting process”). 
 60 Id. at 923 (referring also to “the choice of a multimember over a single-member districting system” 
and “any other such electoral mechanism or method of election that might reduce the weight or 
influence a ballot may have in controlling the outcome of an election”). 
 61 See, e.g., Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1281 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(citing Holder, 512 U.S. at 907); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 26 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in judgment) (citing Holder, 512 U.S. at 891); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 374 (2003) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Holder, 512 U.S. at 899); Georgia v. 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 492 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Holder, 512 U.S. at 891). 
 62 See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1485–86 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Holder, 
512 U.S. at 922–23) (“[Section] 2 does not apply to redistricting and therefore cannot justify a racial 
gerrymander.”). 
 63 Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018). 
 64 Id. at 2318–19. 
 65 Id. at 2326–27.  The Court effectively overturned this matter by focusing on the “totality of 
circumstances” analysis. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing this part of the 
Section 2 analysis). 
 66 Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2335 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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At first glance, Justice Thomas’s Perez concurrence may seem like his 
same old routine,67 but it marks an important shift in the argument that he 
had been making alone for nearly a quarter century.  When newly appointed 
Justice Neil Gorsuch joined the opinion, legal commentators condemned 
him for breathing new life into Justice Thomas’s Holder concurrence.68  Soon 
after, before he even had the chance to take part in oral arguments, some 
speculated that Justice Brett Kavanaugh “[would] join with the court’s 
conservative justices to further roll back [minority] voting rights protections 
and other civil rights laws.”69  Should Justice Kavanaugh join Justices 
Thomas and Gorsuch, the Perez concurrence may be the first in a series of 
signals that the Court is ready to finally take down Section 2 similar to 
Northwest Austin’s relationship to the Coverage Formula.70   
But the serious concern amongst legal commentators is that the Court’s 
recent shakeup positions Chief Justice John Roberts to serve as the Court’s 
mystical swing vote.71  As noted earlier, the Court recently dealt a severe 
blow to the VRA in Shelby County v. Holder.72  Commentators are quick to 
point out that the Chief Justice authored that opinion, thus making him an 
unlikely candidate to preserve minority voter protections.73  Commentators 
 
 67 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (providing examples of Justice Thomas’ commitment to 
the argument that Section 2 does not apply to election-related procedures like gerrymandering). 
 68 See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Neil Gorsuch Declares War on Voting Rights Act, SLATE (June 25, 2018, 11:54 
AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/abbott-v-perez-neil-gorsuch-says-the-voting-
rights-act-does-not-prohibit-racial-gerrymandering.html (describing Justice Gorsuch as a “fierce 
opponent of the [VRA]”).  Mark Joseph Stern, a Supreme Court and legal commentator, also noted 
that Justice Gorsuch joined the Court’s 5-4 margin in two earlier Abbot-related procedural matters 
when the Court blocked lower court rulings that would have required Texas to redraw both its 
legislative and congressional district maps.  Id. (citing Abbott v. Perez, No. 17A225, 2017 U.S. 
LEXIS 4434, at *1 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2017); Abbott v. Perez, No. 17A245, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4435, at 
*1 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2017)).  In summary, Stern described Justice Gorsuch’s short tenure on the Court 
as “declar[ing] war on the VRA, inviting future challenges designed to sabotage the law’s ability to 
guard against racial vote dilution” and proclaiming himself as “a staunch ally to lawmakers who 
wish to suppress the votes of minority Americans.”  Id.  
 69 Ari Berman, Opinion, Does Brett Kavanaugh Spell the End of Voting Rights?, N.Y. TIMES (July 
13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/opinion/sunday/voting-rights-voter-id-
kavanaugh.html.  This fear is largely based on Justice Kavanaugh’s lower court opinion which 
approved South Carolina’s voter identification statute against the federal government’s challenge.  
See id. (referring to South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).  
 70 See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text (summarizing the gradual path the Court took in 
finding the Coverage Formula unconstitutional). 
 71 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Opinion, What the Supreme Court Could Look Like with John Roberts as its 
Swing Vote, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
hasen-roberts-swing-vote-20170410-story.html (considering the effect on the Court’s decisions if its 
political makeup shifted such that Justice Roberts held the swing vote).  
 72 See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court held that the Coverage 
Formula was unconstitutional because the burdens it imposed were not justified by current needs).   
 73 Berman, supra note 69. 
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also look skeptically on his experience prior to the bench—specifically a 1981 
Justice Department memo wherein he argued that the federal government 
should only exert Section 2 authority in intentional discrimination cases and 
not effectual discrimination cases.74  As Professor Richard Hasen observed:  
“[we] may have no choice but to put faith in [Chief Justice] Roberts” as the 
swing vote, and “the possibility that [Chief Justice] Roberts’ restraint is the 
best hope . . . shows us that [we] are in a truly poor position.”75 
Considering Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Holder, and the recent shift 
in the Court’s composition that placed Chief Justice Roberts at its ideological 
center, there is reason to be concerned that Section 2’s minority voter 
protections are “going, gutted, gone.”76  
II.  THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF MINORITY VOTER PROTECTION 
The United States Constitution requires all states to follow federal law,77 
and thus the states must comply with the VRA in their redistricting process.  
However, should the Court decide that Section 2 does not apply to 
redistricting,78 states will have to look elsewhere for additional minority voter 
protections.79  
This Part constructs four categories which represent how states presently 
protect minority voters.  All fifty states are sorted into these four categories 
in the Appendix.80  The four categories are organized on a sliding scale from 
those with the least to the most minority voter protections.  
Category A includes states which offer no state law minority voter 
protections.  Although Category A states must comply with the Supremacy 
Clause, it is strange that these states have not established any minority voter 
protections in either their constitutions or statutory codes.  These states all 
instruct on basic redistricting principles such as allocating their designated 
line drawer the authority to conduct reapportionment81 and establishing a 
timetable to conduct reapportionment after the decennial census data is 
 
 74 Id.; see also Ari Berman, Inside John Roberts’ Decades-Long Crusade Against the Voting Rights Act, POLITICO 
MAG. (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/john-roberts-voting-
rights-act-121222 (detailing Chief Justice Roberts' history on voting rights issues throughout his 
career). 
 75 Hasen, supra note 71. 
 76  RHODES, supra note 21.  
 77 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 78 See infra Part III, which imagines how the Court might dispose of Section 2. 
 79 See supra note 24 (explaining that there remain constitutional provisions to protect minority voters, 
but they are outside the scope of this Article). 
 80 See supra note 23 (explaining this analysis’s limitations). 
 81 See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. III, § 2, ¶ II (requiring that the State Legislature conduct reapportionment). 
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reported.82  But these states fail to make any mention of minority voter 
protections even though the United States has a long history of minority 
voter discrimination.83  Notably, Category A includes seven of the nine states 
that came under the Coverage Formula at the time of the Shelby County 
decision, and one state wherein forty counties were subject to federal 
oversight.84  Thus, these states have earned their unique designation.   
Categories B and C share only a slight difference, and thus they will be 
discussed together throughout this Article.  Category B represents those 
states that only make references to the VRA to protect minority voters in 
their constitutional or statutory language, whereas Category C includes states 
that have reproduced Section 2’s language in their own state law.85  
At this time, in a world where Section 2 is operational, Categories B and 
C function no differently than Category A.  Therefore, their main distinction 
from Category A is that these jurisdictions at least have something in their 
constitutions or statutory codes that demonstrate an intent to protect 
minority voters.  In the context of this Article, this distinction is most 
important when discussing how jurisdictions might be affected if the Court 
decides that discriminatory redistricting claims are no longer a colorable 
claim under Section 2 in federal courts.86 
Finally, Category D consists of those states that have additional measures 
to protect minority voters.  These states, like those in Categories B and C, 
may point directly to the VRA or use language that appears in Section 2.87  
 
 82 See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. 13, § 254 (mandating that the State Legislature begin redistricting after 
the decennial census, and calling upon a backup commission to draw the map if the State 
Legislature cannot successfully complete the process within a specific time frame). 
 83 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (providing a history of minority disenfranchisement). 
 84 Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 (last updated Aug. 6, 
2015). 
 85 Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-1-115(2) (2019) (“In the development of legislative districts, a plan 
is subject to the Voting Rights Act. . . .”), with MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 16-201(a)(7) (Lexis 
Nexis 2020) (“A person may not willfully and knowingly . . . engage in conduct that results or has 
the intent to result in the denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race, color, or disability.”).  One quirky exception that fits into Category B is 
Wisconsin.  Although Wisconsin does not dedicate constitutional or statutory language that directly 
points its line drawers to follow the VRA, the state’s statutory code allows citizens to file petitions 
with the State’s Attorney General that allege the redistricting process did not comply with Section 
2.  WIS. STAT. § 5.081 (2020).  The State’s Attorney General then has the discretionary authority 
to commence legal action in any relevant court.  Id. 
 86 See infra Part IV.B. 
 87 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4(c)(1) (“When drawing district lines, the commission shall consider 
whether such lines would result in the denial or abridgement of racial or language minority voting 
rights, and districts shall not be drawn to have the purpose of, nor shall they result in, the denial or 
abridgement of such rights.”). 
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But these states differ in that they have constructed their own defenses to 
protect minority voters.  For example, some states prioritize drawing districts 
with minority representation,88 while others explicitly prohibit drawing 
districts with “the purpose of diluting the voting strength of any language or 
ethnic minority group.”89  
In total, there are twenty-nine states in Category A, eight in Category B, 
four in Category C, and nine in Category D.90 
III.  HOW THE COURT COULD ELIMINATE SECTION 2  
Since there is reason to believe that the Court may set aside Section 2’s 
minority voter protections,91 this Part explores how the Court could 
accomplish this task.  Furthermore, this Part uses the aforementioned 
Categories92 to explore how the Court’s reasoning would affect the 
remaining minority voter protections across the country.  
A.  Scenario 1: Section 2 is Unconstitutionally Applied to Redistricting  
In this scenario, the Court follows Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring 
opinion in Holder v. Hall and holds that reapportionment is not a “standard, 
practice, or procedure” under Section 2.93  Thus, minority voters could not 
 
 88 See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 120/5-5(a) (LexisNexis 2019) (“[D]istricts shall be drawn . . . to 
create crossover districts, coalition districts, or influence districts.”). 
 89 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 188.010(3) (2019); cf., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48.1(4)(b) (“No map may 
be approved . . . if . . . drawn for the purpose of or results in the denial or abridgement of the right 
of any citizen to vote . . . including diluting the impact of that racial or language minority group’s 
electoral influence.”); FLA. CONST. art. III, § 21(a) (“[D]istricts shall not be drawn with the intent 
or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to 
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their 
choice. . . .”); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14027 (Deering 2020) (“An at-large method of election may 
not . . . impair[] the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice . . . as a result of the 
dilution or the abridgement of the rights of voters . . . .”); IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (2019) (“No district 
shall be drawn . . . for the purpose of augmenting or diluting the voting strength of a language or 
racial minority group.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.92.030(1) (2019) (finding a violation when 
“elections in the political subdivision exhibit polarized voting” and “members of a protected 
class . . . do not have an equal opportunity elect candidates of their choice as a result of the dilution 
or abridgement of the rights of members of that protected class”).   
 90 See infra Appendix. 
 91 See supra Part I.B. (suggesting grounds such as the shift in the Court’s composition and growing 
support for the position that Section 2 should not apply to racial gerrymandering claims). 
 92 See supra Part II (explaining the different approaches that states take in protecting minority voters in 
the redistricting process). 
 93 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).  See supra notes 45–60 and 
accompanying text for more details on the Court’s opinion in Holder v. Hall, and Justice Thomas’s 
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use Section 2 to challenge discriminatory intent or effect in the redistricting 
context, nor would they be able to rely on language that references or tracks 
Section 2 to make those challenges in state courts.94  
Categories A, B, and C are most affected in this scenario because they 
rely on federal jurisprudence in applying Section 2 to redistricting claims.  
Category A jurisdictions already rely solely on Section 2 through the 
Supremacy Clause because neither their constitutional or statutory language 
make reference to federal minority voter protections, nor do they establish 
their own protections.95  Category B similarly relies solely on Section 2 
because these jurisdictions simply point to federal law as controlling in this 
matter.96  Since Category C jurisdictions have their own constitutional and 
statutory language dedicated to protecting minority voters,97 any jurisdiction 
with language accompanied by its own jurisprudence would survive this scenario.  But 
at this time, none of the minority voter protections in Category C 
jurisdictions fit this description, and thus they would all suffer the same fate 
as Category A and B jurisdictions. 
Under this ruling, Category D jurisdictions still have some defenses to 
challenge effectual discrimination because they offer additional minority 
voters protections beyond what appears in Section 2.98  Furthermore, like 
Category C, any jurisdiction with protections that use language that tracks 
with Section 2 and is accompanied by its own jurisprudence would survive 
this scenario.99  But those jurisdictions that include these provisions and 
simply follow federal jurisprudence would be struck down like Categories A, 
 
concurrence.  This Article does not consider a scenario where Section 2 is found unconstitutional 
because that possibility is inconceivable at this time.  See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 
537, 557 (2013) (“Section 2 is permanent, applies nationwide, and is not at issue in this case. . . . 
Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting 
found in [Section] 2”); Holder, 512 U.S. at 893 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Section 2 does 
“reach . . . state enactments that limit citizens’ access to the ballot”). 
 94 Recall that no matter what the Court may do to Section 2, there are still constitutional backstops 
that plaintiffs may use to challenge redistricting schemes. See supra note 24 (noting other means such 
as the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as procedural due process). 
 95 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.  
 96 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 97 See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 98 See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.  For a detailed description of the additional 
protections in each Category D jurisdiction, see infra Appendix. 
 99 For example, California’s statutory code uses language that mirrors what appears in Section 2.  
Compare 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012), with CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14027 (Deering 2020).  But California’s 
statute would survive a facial challenge under this scenario because its courts have deciphered its 
meaning in a way that makes it distinctive from Section 2.  See, e.g., Rey v. Madera Unified Sch. 
Dist., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that “the [California] Legislature’s 
use of the phrase ‘imposed or applied’ indicates that . . . violating Elections Code section 14027 is 
premised on the party having taken some sort of affirmative action with respect to the election.”). 
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B, and C.100  Thus, Category D encompasses the only jurisdictions that 
currently have minority voter protections at the state-level which could 
survive this scenario. 
B.  Scenario 2: Federal Minority Voters Protections are Gutted 
In Holder v. Hall, Justice Thomas argues that Congress did not appoint 
the Justices to be “mighty Platonic guardians . . . [who] determine the best 
form of local government for every county, city, village, and town in 
America.”101  Instead, Congress granted the Court limited authority, so “[the 
Court] should be cautious in interpreting any Act of Congress to grant [it] 
power to make such determinations.”102  
Under that reasoning, in this scenario, the Court holds that 
discriminatory redistricting challenges can no longer be brought into federal 
courts under Section 2.  This is a more limited approach than discussed in 
Scenario 1.  Although Scenario 2 would still have the same effect on 
Categories A and B because those jurisdictions solely rely on the VRA in 
these matters,103 this limited holding would permit Category C and D 
jurisdictions to continue reviewing discriminatory reapportionment claims 
under their respective constitutional and statutory language.104  Notably, 
unlike in Scenario 1,105 Category C and D jurisdictions that have state laws 
that track Section 2 language survive this scenario whether or not the 
language is accompanied by its own jurisprudence at the time of the Court’s 
decision because the Court’s holding is limited to federal courts.  
C.  Commentary on Scenarios 1 and 2 
Scenario 2 is the more likely outcome for two reasons. First, due to the 
recent shift in the Court’s composition,106 many commentators have 
speculated about public confidence in a politicized Supreme Court.107  
 
 100 See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 101 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 913 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 102 Id. 
 103 See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.  
 104 Regardless of what happened in the Category D jurisdictions, they would retain their additional 
minority voter protections on redistricting matters like in Scenario 1.  See supra note 98 and 
accompanying text.  
 105 See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
 106 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 107 See, e.g., Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Opinion, The Hidden Silver Lining if Kavanaugh is Confirmed, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-hidden-silver-lining-
if-kavanaugh-is-confirmed/2018/10/05/fc2d7fb6-c8ce-11e8-b2b5-79270f9cce17_story.html?ut
m_term=.903e731a38c5. 
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Although Chief Justice Roberts’ position on voting rights has garnered 
significant speculation,108 Supreme Court commentators have also argued 
that the Chief Justice is particularly conscious about the Court’s legacy under 
his leadership.109  Thus, if the Court were to limit Section 2’s application, he 
may look for a way to limit the effect.  
Second, and more importantly, Justice Thomas’s aggressive approach 
has not gained traction over the years.  Although Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Samuel Alito were not on the Court at the time of Holder v. Hall, they 
have both passed on numerous opportunities to join Justice Thomas’s 
position.110 
Notably, Scenario 2 shares a key characteristic with the Court’s Shelby 
County decision:  the Court would gut Section 2 for vagueness while inviting 
Congress to pass further legislation111 that clarifies whether reapportionment 
is an election “standard, practice, or procedure.”  This may not be Justice 
Thomas’s most desired outcome, but it would stop all Section 2 redistricting 
claims from ever reaching his desk again.  
IV.  WHAT STATES CAN DO TO PREVENT MINORITY VOTER 
DISCRIMINATION 
As demonstrated in Part III, many states are unprepared to protect 
minority voters' rights in the event that the Supreme Court either guts or 
strikes down Section 2 of the VRA.  This Part offers proactive remedies to 
this problem.  It follows a path already suggested by many legal 
commentators:  return to the “test tubes of democracy” to “normalize 
election practices.”112  This Part reviews the different mechanisms used 
across the country—and the legal challenges to those efforts—to outline what 
 
 108 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 109 E.g., Baum & Devins, supra note 107 (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts may steer the Court to 
limited decisions because the political turmoil surrounding how the Court’s ideology shifted 
exacerbates his unique role as the Court’s institutional leader who must “maintain[] the court’s 
standing by fostering its esteem among the general public”). 
 110 See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2312–13 (2018) (Alito, J., filing the Court’s opinion) 
(Roberts, C.J., joining); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1486 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (Roberts, C.J., joining); Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. 
Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J., joining); 
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 532–34 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., filing the Court’s opinion) 
(Alito, J., joining); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 5 (2009) (Kennedy, J., filing the Court’s 
opinion) (Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J., joining). 
 111 See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557 (“Congress may draft another formula based on current 
conditions.”). 
 112 Joshua A. Douglas, Opinion, To Safeguard Voting Rights, Go Local, CNN (Feb. 17, 2017, 2:58 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/17/opinions/improve-voting-local-level-douglas/index.html.  
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practices states can implement to secure minority voter protections in their 
own jurisdictions.113  
A.  State Constitutional Hook 
The most obvious way to protect minority voters is to return to the basics:  
the fundamental right to vote.  When litigants rely on federal claims to 
protect voting rights, they point towards “‘negative’ rights, or prohibitions 
on governmental action, as opposed to specifically stated grants of individual 
liberties.”114  The federal constitution mentions the right to vote seven times, 
but never actually grants the right to vote.115  Meanwhile, forty-nine states 
explicitly grant the right to vote,116 and the fiftieth state (Arizona) implicitly 
confers this right.117  
Since the fundamental right to vote is grounded in each states’ 
constitution, states can look to these foundational documents to protect 
minority voters in the districting process.  Most notably, twenty-six state 
constitutions mandate that elections be “free,” “free and equal,” or “free and 
open.”118  States could look to these provisions to protect minority voters 
because plaintiffs recently succeeded in using Pennsylvania’s Free and Equal 
Clause119 to strike down a statewide partisan gerrymander.  
In League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania concluded that the Commonwealth’s districting scheme 
diluted Democrats’ votes to the extent that “all voters [did] not have an equal 
opportunity to translate their votes into representation.”120  The Court 
recognized its broad interpretation, but reasoned that this expansive scope 
“guard[ed] against the risk of unfairly rendering votes nugatory, artificially 
entrenching representative power, and discouraging voters from 
 
 113 No jurisdiction is perfect—even those in Category D could do more to ensure that minority voters 
are protected.  This Part is not intended to scold those states in Categories A, B, and C.  Instead, 
this Part aims to offer every jurisdiction a panoply of options for further action.  
 114 Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 95 (2014) (citations 
omitted).  
 115 Id. at 96–97 (referring to Article I, § 2, and the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, 
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments). 
 116 Id. at 101. 
 117 Id. at 102.  (“[S]tating that ‘no person shall be entitled to vote . . . unless’ the person meets the 
citizenship, residency, and age requirements.”) (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2).  
 118 Id. at 103. 
 119 PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Elections shall be free and equal; and no power, civil or military, shall at 
any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”). 
 120 League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 814 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied, Turzai v. 
Brandt, 139 S. Ct. 445 (2018). 
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participating in the electoral process because they have come to believe that 
the power of their individual vote . . . ‘does not count.’”121 
Although League of Women Voters reviewed a partisan gerrymander, a court 
may apply the same principle when assessing racial or ethnic minority vote 
dilution.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that vote dilution was 
“the antithesis of a healthy representative democracy. . . . because each and 
every Pennsylvania voter must have the same free and equal opportunity to 
select his or her representatives.”122  Thus, the Court did not find that the 
Free and Equal Clause ensures Democrats and Republicans have the same free 
and equal opportunity to select their representatives—it found that all voters 
have the same free and equal opportunity to select their representatives.  No 
matter what group the voters belong to, the Court held that vote dilution 
contravened the Commonwealth’s Free and Equal Clause. 
Besides Fair and Equal Clauses, three state constitutions require 
“competitive” districts.123  So far, only Arizona’s Competitiveness Clause has 
received judicial attention, but the state’s Supreme Court merely clarified the 
provision rather than reviewed it on the merits.124  Since these state 
constitutional provisions were not designed—or yet been proven—to protect 
minority voters, they cannot be used to bring these jurisdictions into 
Category D.125  
Nevertheless, litigants should consider pursuing these state constitutional 
claims because they can avoid messy federal election law jurisprudence and 
favorable decisions are unlikely to merit federal review.126  
 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 123 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F) (“To the extent practicable, competitive districts should be 
favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals.”); COLO. CONST. 
art. V, § 46(1)(c) (“The redistricting commission should set district lines by ensuring constitutionally 
guaranteed voting rights, including the protection of minority group voting, as well as fair and 
effective representation of constituents using politically neutral criteria.”); MO. CONST. art. III, § 
3(c)(1)(b) (“Districts shall be designed in a manner that achieves both partisan fairness and, 
secondarily, competitiveness.”).  Notably, the state of Washington also requires “competitive” 
districts, but through the state’s statutory code.  WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.090(5) (2018) (“The 
commission shall exercise its powers to provide fair and effective representation and to encourage 
electoral competition.”). 
 124 Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 208 P.3d 676, 
686 (Ariz. 2009). 
 125 See infra Appendix. 
 126 See Charlie Stewart, State Court Litigation: The New Front in the War Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 116 
MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 152, 159 (2018) (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding 
that “a claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution’s free and clear elections clause should be 
adjudicated” differently than under the federal equal protection clause “insulated [it] from Supreme 
Court Review”). 
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B.  Mini-VRAs 
States can further defend historically disenfranchised minority groups by 
enacting their own “mini-VRAs.”  So far, there is little academic writing on 
the topic.  But those scholars discussing mini-VRAs view them as offering 
substantive and procedural benefits to minority voters and the legal system, 
as well as forecasting a future where states “legislate[] without federal 
oversight.”127 
The California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (CVRA)128 was the first mini-
VRA.129  It targets “racially polarized voting”130 by allowing minority voters 
to challenge at-large election schemes in state courts.131  A violation of the 
CVRA occurs when “it is shown that racially polarized voting occurs in 
elections for members of the governing body of the political subdivision or in 
elections incorporating other electoral choices by the voters of the political 
subdivision.”132  The CVRA builds on the federal statute to provide plaintiffs 
an easier opportunity to challenge at-large election schemes.133  But unlike 
the federal statute, the CVRA allows plaintiffs to establish a successful 
discrimination challenge without having to prove geographical compactness 
 
 127 E.g., Kareem U. Crayton, Reinventing Voting Rights Preclearance, 44 IND. L. REV. 201, 239–41 (2010). 
 128 California Voting Rights Act of 2001, ch. 129, 2002 Cal. Stat. 703 (codified as amended at CAL. 
ELEC. CODE §§ 14025–14032 (West 2020)).  
 129 Crayton, supra note 127, at 239.  
 130 ELEC. § 14026 (defining “racially polarized voting” as “voting in which there is a difference . . . in 
the choice of candidates or other electoral choices that are preferred by voters in a protected class, 
and in the choice of candidates and electoral choices that are preferred by voters in the rest of the 
electorate”). 
 131 See ELEC. § 14027 (“An at-large method of election may not be imposed or applied in a manner 
that impairs the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to influence 
the outcome of an election, as a result of the dilution or the abridgment of the rights of voters who 
are members of a protected class . . . .”). 
 132 ELEC. § 14028(a).  “The occurrence of racially polarized voting shall be determined from examining 
results of elections in which at least one candidate is a member of a protected class or elections 
involving ballot measures, or other electoral choices that affect the rights and privileges of members 
of a protected class.”  Id. ELEC. § 14028(b). 
 133 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining that geographical compactness is a necessary 
factor to establish a Section 2 claim).  
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or concentration.134  The drawback is that the CVRA only applies to at-large 
election schemes.135 
The CVRA has already survived multiple Equal Protection challenges.  
First, the California Court of Appeals held that the CVRA was race-neutral 
because it did not favor one race over another, nor benefit or burden a 
litigant based on race.136  More recently, a California District Court 
dismissed a similar claim for lack of evidence that the litigant’s district, as 
drawn under the CVRA, classified the litigant into his district based on race, 
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.137   
A mini-VRA out of Illinois takes a different approach.  The Illinois 
Voting Rights Act of 2011 (“IVRA”)138 instead tries to limit large minority 
voter populations from being fractured in the redistricting process.  The 
IVRA instructs line drawers “to create crossover districts, coalition districts, 
or influence districts” when possible to benefit “racial minorit[ies] [and] 
language minorit[ies].”139  The IVRA specifically defines “racial minorities 
or language minorities” as the “same class of voters who are members of a 
race, color, or language minority group receiving protection under the 
federal [VRA].”140  
The IVRA also survived its own constitutional challenge.  Plaintiffs 
argued that the IVRA violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
elevated race to be the predominant factor in redistricting.141  But the 
Northern District Court of Illinois found that the IVRA survived this 
 
 134 See ELEC. § 14028(c) (“The fact that members of a protected class are not geographically compact 
or concentrated may not preclude a finding of racially polarized voting . . . .”).  Notably, plaintiffs 
may use compactness to demonstrate vote dilution, but it is not required.  See ELEC. § 14028(c), (e) 
(listing "voting practices or procedures that may enhance the dilutive effects of at-large elections” 
as among “probative, but not necessary factors” to establish a successful claim”). 
 135 See Joaquin G. Avila et al., Voting Rights in California: 1982–2006, 17 REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 131, 152 
(2007) (noting that the CVRA “does not apply to other methods of elections, redistrictings or other 
voting changes”).  See also Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, The Color of Change: Voting Rights in the 21st 
Century and the California Voting Rights Act, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 183, 192–96 (2012) for a more 
in-depth comparison between the CVRA and Section 2. 
 136 Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 137 Higginson v. Becerra, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1127–28 (S.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 786 F. App’x 705 
(Mem.) (9th Cir. 2019). 
 138 Illinois Voting Rights Act of 2011, Pub. Act No. 96-1541, 2010 Ill. Laws 7774 (codified at 10 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. §§ 120/5-1–5-5).  
 139 § 120/5-5(a)–(b).  For further clarification, the state of Illinois defines these terms for the line drawer. 
Id. § 120/5-5(b). 
 140 § 120/5-5(c). 
 141 Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11-cv-04884, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122053, at *24–
25 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011). 
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challenge because it clearly states that any use of race in line drawing must 
be subservient to federal and Illinois constitutional law.142  
Although the mini-VRA is a new and relatively untested concept, they 
have so far survived constitutional challenges to address specific minority 
voter problems in their respective jurisdictions.  Unlike the state 
constitutional hooks discussed at length in Part IV.A, mini-VRAs do shift 
states into Category D because they are established for the purpose of 
protecting minority voters in the redistricting process.143 
C.  Multimember Districts 
Multimember districts (“MMDs”) are probably the most agreed upon 
way to remedy minority vote dilution.  MMDs are “electoral districts that 
send two or more members to a legislative chamber.”144  The concept is best 
understood in contrast to its counterparts: single-member districts 
(“SMDs”)—districts that elect only one representative to the legislature145—
and at-large districts—districts that extend over the entire political 
subdivision and elect either one or several candidates.146     
SMDs are not inherent to the Constitution’s structure, nor United States’ 
history,147 yet SMDs are the norm among states.  Ten state legislatures 
presently have at least one legislative chamber with MMDs,148 but many 
states limit the practice to some degree.  At least six states outright require 
SMDs.149  Meanwhile, some states only require SMDs in the State Senate,150 
and others only require SMDs in the State House or Assembly.151  Hawaii 
and New Jersey are anomalies.  Hawaii allows MMDs, but limits them to 
 
 142 Id. at *25–26 (citing § 120/5-5(a), (d)). 
 143 See infra Appendix. 
 144 State Legislative Chambers that Use Multi-Member Districts, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/State_legislative_chambers_that_use_multi-member_districts (last visited 
July 25, 2020) [hereinafter MMDs Explained]. 
 145 The Redistricting Glossary, supra note 43. 
 146 Id.  Presently, at-large districts are only used by states which are allotted one representative in the 
House of Representatives.  MMDs Explained, supra note 144. 
 147 See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 897–98 (1994) (Thomas, J. concurring) (finding “no principle 
inherent” in the Constitution that makes SMDs the “‘proper’ mechanism for electing 
representatives" and noting that “[i]t was not until 1842 that Congress determined that 
Representatives should be elected from [SMDs]”). 
 148 MMDs Explained, supra note 144 (citing Arizona, Idaho, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia as having MMDs in their 
respective state legislatures). 
 149 See ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 4; CONN. CONST. art. III, §§ 3-4; KAN. CONST. art. II, § 2; LA. 
CONST. art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. art. III, § 3; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 2. 
 150 E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IX, § 200; MASS. CONST. amend. art. CI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 26. 
 151 E.g., N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5. 
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four representatives per district.152  New Jersey requires that two 
representatives are elected from each district.153   
Critics highlight the winner-take-all format as the inherent problem with 
SMDs because it leads to—among other things—low representation for 
racial minorities.154  In contrast, MMDs offer racial minorities an 
opportunity to regularly elect a candidate of choice without being packed 
into majority-minority districts.  For example, one study of Louisiana at the 
federal level found that SMDs created one minority-preferred candidate 
alongside five other safely held seats in the state, but MMDs would create 
two minority-preferred candidates, two safely held seats, and two moderate 
representatives.155  But MMDs accomplish more than just increased minority 
representation in the state legislature—they place every voter, regardless of 
race, in the position to elect a candidate of choice.156 
Even Justice Clarence Thomas recognized the benefits of MMDs in his 
Holder v. Hall concurrence.  He described non-winner-take-all systems as 
“voting mechanisms . . . that can produce proportional results without 
requiring division of the electorate into racially segregated districts.”157  If 
Justice Thomas points to a way to solve the underlying issues that keep 
plaguing the Court—and him—with Section 2 claims, then it serves states as 
a strong indicator to where they may find a suitable mechanism to protect 
minority voters.  
It is important to note here that MMDs do not factor into this Article’s 
categorization of jurisdictions.158  Although MMDs have been demonstrated 
to benefit minority voters in the redistricting process to access political 
representation,159 they do not factor into this part of the analysis because they 
are not a tool to seek legal remedy.  Instead, jurisdictions should view MMDs 
as a means to avoid litigation entirely. 
 
 152 HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(7). 
 153 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § II, ¶ 4. 
 154 E.g., Rob Richie & Andrew Spencer, The Right Choice for Elections:  How Choice Voting Will End 
Gerrymandering and Expand Minority Voting Rights, From City Councils to Congress, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 
959, 960 (2013). 
 155 Id. at 1004–05 (citing 2011 Redistricting and 2012 Elections in Louisiana, FAIRVOTE (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.fairvote.org/assets/2012-Redistricting/). 
 156 Id. at 1006. 
 157 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 909–10 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 158 See infra Appendix. 
 159 See supra notes 154–56156 and accompanying text. 
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D.  Independent Redistricting Commissions  
States may also consider implementing independent redistricting 
commissions (“IRCs”) to protect minority voting communities.  IRCs are 
groups of citizens that a state authorizes to conduct the redistricting 
process.160  IRCs recently faced a constitutional challenge, but the Supreme 
Court upheld the voters’ ability to reassign redistricting authority from the 
state legislature to an independent group.161  Six states will use IRCs in the 
2021–2022 redistricting cycle.162 
There are various rules to ensure that politics stay out of IRCs.  For 
example, elected and public officials are ineligible to become members of 
IRCs, and some states even bar legislative staff and lobbyists from 
participation.163  Furthermore, once a citizen becomes a member of an IRC, 
there can be certain restrictions placed on them such as becoming ineligible 
to run for elected office in the districts that they draw or a ban on becoming 
a registered lobbyist for a period in the future.164 
But IRC rules do not solely address partisanship redistricting concerns—
they also extend to minority voter protections.  For example, Arizona directs 
its IRC to draw district boundaries that “respect communities of interest to 
the extent practicable.”165  Michigan has a similar “communities of interest” 
directive, but clarifies that “communities of interest” includes “populations 
that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests . . .  
[and] not . . . relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political 
 
 160 See Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php (last visited July 25, 2020) (describing the various groups, such 
as an IRC, that draw district lines across different states) .   
 161 Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658–59, 2677 (2015).  
For further review on this case, and information on IRCs generally, see Barry Edwards et al., Can 
Independent Redistricting Commissions Lead Us Out of the Political Thicket?, 9 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 288 
(2016). 
 162 See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 46(2); 
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-20-201 (West 
2020). 
 163 See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2 § 1(3); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 
47(2)(c); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(1)(b); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5-b(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-
19-201(6) (West 2020). 
 164 See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2 § 1(3); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c);  MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 
6(1)(e). 
 165 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2 § 1(14)(D); see also N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4(c)(5) (directing IRC to 
“consider the maintenance . . . of pre-existing political subdivisions, including . . . communities of 
interest”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-20-302(5)(a) (West 2020) (making “preserving communities of 
interest” a redistricting priority). 
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candidates.”166  New York and Colorado go the furthest by requiring that 
the IRC’s composition “reflect” their respective populations.167  This all but 
ensures that minority voters will sit on the IRC and have a voice in the 
redistricting process. 
Some scholars argue that, in practice, IRCs are “inconsequential for 
communities of color” because IRCs “fail[] . . . to enhance minority 
representation.”168  Others argue that IRCs simply shift the “significant social 
and political pressures to produce a set of district lines that is fair to all 
relevant interest groups, including those that define themselves by race” from 
the legislature to citizens,169 and some assert that “partisan redistricting 
aimed at protecting incumbents . . . results in a preferred legislative 
product.”170  But IRCs are such a relatively new tool in the districting 
process, and thus such a small sample size cannot yet yield a definitive 
conclusion.  Thus, the fact that a jurisdiction has an IRC does not factor into 
this Article’s categorization of jurisdictions unless the statute expressly states 
an intention to protect minority voters.171  Even though there is little data on 
IRCs at this time, states should still be encouraged to implement IRCs in a 
way that directs line drawers away from vote dilution through built-in 
minority voter protections.    
CONCLUSION 
The combination of Justice Thomas’s continued opposition to Section 2 
in the redistricting context and the change in the Court’s ideological 
composition has led to the concern that Section 2 may be “going, gutted, 
 
 166 MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6(13)(c); see also COLO. CONST. art. V, § 46(3)(b)(I) (defining community 
of interest as “any group in Colorado that shares one or more substantial interests that may be the 
subject of state legislative action, is composed of a reasonably proximate population, and thus 
should be considered for inclusion within a single district for purposes of ensuring its fair and 
effective representation”). 
 167 See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(10)(a) (“To the extent possible, ensure that the [IRC] reflects 
Colorado’s racial, ethnic, gender, and geographic diversity.”); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 5-b(c) (“To 
the extent practicable, the members of the [IRC] shall reflect the diversity of the residents of this 
state with regard to race, ethnicity, gender, language, and geographic residence and to the extent 
practicable the appointing authorities shall consult with organizations devoted to protecting the 
voting rights of minority and other voters concerning potential appointees to the [IRC].”). 
 168 Glenn D. Magpantay, So Much Huff and Puff:  Whether Independent Redistricting Commissions are 
Inconsequential for Communities of Color, 16 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 4, 6 (2011). 
 169 Melissa L. Saunders, Of Minority Representation, Multiple-Race Responses, and Melting Pots:  Redistricting in 
the New America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1367, 1369–70 (2001).  
 170 C. Daniel Chill, Political Gerrymandering: Was Elbridge Gerry Right?, 33 TOURO. L. REV. 795, 796 
(2017). 
 171 See infra Appendix. 
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gone.”  In examining vote dilution protections at the state level, it is clear 
that many states are largely unprepared to be without Section 2’s minority 
voter protections in the redistricting context.  Forty-one states are in 
Categories A, B, and C172—meaning that nearly every jurisdiction in the 
United States relies solely on Section 2 to protect minority communities from 
vote dilution.  This is unacceptable.  
Luckily, many states offer roadmaps for how to protect minority voters.  
Some require dusting off unused language in a state’s constitutional or 
statutory language, and others call upon the political grit that accompanies 
legislative action.  All voters should have the opportunity to participate in fair 
elections and be able to elect the candidate of their choice in those fair 
elections.  But even more fundamental—a voter’s ability to challenge unfair 
districting schemes should not hinge on a shift in one courthouse’s bench.   
  
 
 172 See infra Appendix. 
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n
g
; 
a
n
d
 (
b
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p
ro
te
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ed
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a
ss
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o
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h
a
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u
a
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o
p
p
o
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n
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 e
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n
d
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th
ei
r 
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o
ic
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a
 r
es
u
lt
 o
f 
th
e 
d
il
u
ti
o
n
 o
r 
ab
ri
d
gm
en
t 
o
f 
th
e 
ri
g
h
ts
 o
f 
m
em
b
er
s 
o
f 
th
a
t 
p
ro
te
ct
ed
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la
ss
 o
r 
cl
a
ss
es
.”
 
 
1476 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:5 
 
